I. Introduction
Crude estimates suggest that the informal production sector is large, accounting for 20 to 50 percent of employment in many developing countries (Portes, 1994 ). Yet progress towards consensus on the sector's origins, operations and even definition has been hampered by two problems. 1 First, the lack of comprehensive data has prevented accurately establishing the basic characteristics of informal production beyond conjecture and casual observation. Second, whereas the literature on informal finance --i.e. unregulated financial intermediation --has a broad theoretical underpinning, 2 the literature on informal production tends toward ad hoc characterizations and lacks a comparably broad foundation. 3 In general, these frameworks rely on an institutional distortion such as a binding minimum wage, evasion of government regulation and taxation, or differences between firms in worker monitoring ability to generate the informal sector.
4
1 A large body of literature equates informality with the low-wage, low-productivity segment of a dual labor market (for example, Lewis, 1954, and Harris and Todaro, 1970 ). An equally sizeable literature equates informality with unregulated self-employment (for example, Hart, 1972, and de Soto, 1989) . See Thomas (1992) and Portes (1994) for excellent overviews. Our approach in this paper equates informality and noncompliance with societal norms such as tax obligations, labor protections, census enumerations, business guild participation, etc. In line with both Thomas' and Portes' characterizations, we are concerned with unregulated/unmonitored activities that are ostensibly legal, not those that are truly illegal (criminal).
2 See Besley (1995) for an excellent overview. 3 See Thomas (1992) and Portes (1994) . Exceptions include Esfahani and Salehi-Isfahani (1989) , Rauch (1991) , Loayza (1995) , and Banerji and Jain (1996) . 4 For the remainder of the paper we will use "informal" exclusively to characterize the production and This paper makes two contributions. First, it offers systematically collected data on a broad cross-section of urban firms in Mexico with details on compliance with or participation in a number of different societal institutions. The data are derived from a nationally representative sample of all such firms, a significant improvement over pre-existing case study data sets. We are thus able to move beyond anecdotal analysis and establish some definitive stylized facts about informal production for the first time.
distribution of goods processes.
Second, it offers a theoretical framework to motivate the analysis of the data. The approach is unique because it assumes that informal firms behave no differently from small firms in industrialized counties and that no institutional or governmental distortions are required to generate their behavior. To this end the analysis builds on recent mainstream empirical and theoretical research on firm dynamics and extends it to incorporate a general concept of formality.
The traditional view of tax and regulatory compliance is that government enforcement is the sole determinant. 5 In contrast, we argue that voluntary compliance may arise because the firm derives either direct or complementary benefits from participating in a particular societal institution.
Several appealing results emerge. First, the framework is able to generate many of the cross-sectional patterns of firm and worker behavior addressed by existing models and those found in our data. Second, previous approaches have been static: firms are either formal or informal and none transition in equilibrium. However, empirical evidence suggests that developing country (LDC) firms share some of the evolutionary dynamics of their industrialized country counterparts. We show that these dynamics may be important when analyzing informality because they can generate firm characteristics commonly associated with the formality-informality comparison. Moreover, such dynamics imply equilibrium transitions from informality to formality.
The nature of the data employed does not permit following individual firms over time and hence precludes rigorous testing of the dynamic predictions. However, we add a new dimension to the theoretical literature and the predicted cross sectional patterns are supported empirically. Finally, the framework can nest many of the existing conceptions of informality, including models that generate the sector through governmental or institutional distortions.
I. Formality as participation in civic institutions
5 For example see Ashenfelter and Smith (1979) , Fenn and Veljanovski (1988) , Cowell (1990) .
Different contributions in the literature view compliance with or participation in the institutions of society in seemingly inconsistent ways. Some emphasize firms' desires to evade taxes, regulations or other state controls (for example, Loayza, 1995) . Others see the inability to access institutions, such as those securing property rights, as hampering firm growth (for example, de Soto, 1989) . Further there tends to be an assumption that formality is an all or nothing state.
We argue that these views are valid only as special cases of a more general and continuous relation between the firm and society.
We recast the question of formality as the firm's decision of how much to participate in the numerous institutions of civil society: federal and local treasuries, governmental programs such as social security (including pensions and health care), the legal system, the banking system, health inspection, firm censuses, trade organizations, civic organizations, etc. We argue that a minimal degree of participation in some institutions is a necessary input to growth for many firms, and that participation increases with the success of the business. That is, formality can be viewed as a normal input to production:
where L is labor, K is capital, and P is participation in (a number of different) societal institutions, and all three inputs are complementary. (Besley, 1995) may be sufficient to fulfill the firm's external financing needs at low levels of production. However, the small scale and undiversified nature of informal capital markets makes them unsuitable for satisfying the firm's financing needs at larger scales of operation. Growing firms will turn to formal financial intermediaries such as banks.
3. Access to public risk-pooling mechanisms. In order to attract good quality workers the firm may have to offer fringe benefits such as workers compensation, health/unemployment/disability insurance, and pensions. However, uncertainty over the expected 7 While we frame the empirical discussion in terms of formal versus informal firms, the concept of informality also applies to subsets of transactions that an ostensibly formal firm may undertake. For example, Palay (1984 Palay ( , 1985 shows that certain transactions between rail-freight shippers and their clients in the United States can be characterized as informal because they occur outside the bounds defined by regulation, and hence are legally unenforceable. In keeping with our motivation here, we would expect such informal transactions to take place primarily between two parties that have a long-standing relationship, even if both parties are large firms and not individual people. A different perspective is offered by Portes (1994) who notes that a portion of economic activity at officially-sanctioned firms often goes unreported; that portion of transactions should be considered informal.
costs of these benefits is high for risk pools with limited numbers of participants, i.e. small firms.
Indeed, there is evidence that United States firms backed the introduction of a workers' compensation system to decrease the risk of self-insuring against individual claims (Fishback and Kantor, 1996) . Hence, even in the absence of mandatory enrollment laws, a firm may want to enroll in government programs that pool risks over a larger population than its own employees.
In exchange for this participation, society imposes "taxes" such as reporting requirements, 8 fiscal obligations, or social insurance payments. We can conceive of these as comprising an initial fixed cost p 0 that may include information or initial registration costs such as those documented by de Soto (1989) , and per period costs, p t , such as taxation that we assume for simplicity are the same for all firms. 9 We initially assume that the market for formality is voluntary (society levies no costs on firms that choose not to participate in an institution) and that non-payers are perfectly excluded (no free riders). While extreme, these assumptions are consistent with voluntary health or social security programs, and business associations. For example, Chile's self-employed are offered the choice of whether to participate in the state social security program (The Economist, 1996) .
Just as importantly, our approach highlights an important effect that is not considered by the standard approach in the literatures on tax evasion and regulatory compliance (for example, Cowell, 1990, Fenn and Veljanovski, 1988) . These assume that enforcement is the only determinant of compliance because no private benefit is derived from participation: the institution is treated as a strict public good. However, there may be private benefits that make compliance in many public institutions voluntary. In the mandatory workers' compensation system example cited above, the private benefit of participation outweighed the private cost for many, if not all, firms.
De Soto claimed that Peruvian sidewalk vendors sought, not to avoid but, to pay taxes as a way to establish property rights over their precarious business locations. In reality, though the direct private benefit from paying taxes may be zero (again, assuming no enforcement penalties), there may be ancillary benefits that make compliance worthwhile.
10
10 Even in cases where the private benefit of participation does not exceed the private cost, the net private cost may differ substantially, leading to different probabilities of compliance conditional on a given level of enforcement resources. For example, it may be quite difficult for a firm to undo the effects of a binding minimum wage if the compensation package does not include fringe benefits that can be reduced when the wage is raised. In contrast, it may be easier for the firm to comply with mandated health, pension or other benefits programs by adjusting the wage without significantly altering labor input (for example, Gruber, 1994) . Our general point is that the probability of compliance is a positive function of the relative private benefit of participation (net of private costs).
This very stylized concept of participation can now be embedded in a model of firm dynamics that has become popular in the industrial organization literature.
11 A number of the existing models of the informal sector (e.g. Rauch, 1991) conditional on information received prior to time t), pay a one time fixed cost of entry, and thereafter choose a level of output q t to maximize expected profits:
where P t is the (price-taking) firms' output price. Each period firms get new information on their cost structure from the level of profits. Firms that realize profits above their expected level revise downward their estimate, x t e , because
This yields two important predictions. First, Jovanovic showed from equation (1) that which, given the properties of the cost function, implies that a lower cost multiplier raises the level of output. Thus, longstanding firms differ in size because some firms discover that they are more efficient than others. Since participation is a normal input in the production process, the distribution of formality among established firms reflects the underlying distribution of ?.
Second, this learning process broadly defines firms' trajectories of growth and formality over time. Unexpectedly good information on profits leads to a downward revision in x e t+1 and a rise in q t+1 above q t ; i.e. the firm grows. It also permits more precise estimates of ?, making viable firms more confident that they will survive. Both elements influence the choice of the degree of participation: A firm will choose to become formal if the discounted benefit net of p t across the expected lifetime of the firm exceeds the fixed costs, p 0 . Figure 1 presents three highly stylized alternate firm trajectories. 13 A new small firm that realizes profits that suggest a high x e t+1 will stop growing at a relatively small size. These "Type 2" firms --the small survivors --include businesses such as corner grocery stores, push cart vendors, and door-to-door sales operations with relatively high ?. Given the relatively low benefits of formality for small firms, the expected discounted present value of participation may not exceed p 0 until the firm is very confident about its long run viability, if ever.
In contrast, a firm realizing large unexpected profits will sharply revise downward its x e t+1 and set q t+1 much higher than q t. These "Type 1" businesses in Figure 1 --the large survivors --also start small but rapidly expand to a large long-run size. Examples of this type of firm are medium-to large-scale manufacturing plants and wholesale trade warehouses. have been drawn so that the percentage increase in revenue is approximately the same for firm types 1 and 2. Comparable proportionate increases in net revenue for small and large firms is a reasonable assumption given that participation is a complement to the other inputs to production.
However, as explained below, it is not crucial for the key conclusions to be drawn from the analysis.
One feature of the Jovanovic model is that there is a common failure bound for all firms in an industry, a size below which no firm can profitably operate. Large firms are farther from the failure bound, so they have a higher survival probability. This translates into a longer expected lifetime at any given age. Suppose D is the length of expected firm life --measured from the current period forward, not from the date of firm formation --at which the discounted present value of the net benefits of formality (net of p t ) exactly equals p 0 . Those firms with expected lifetimes greater than D --the larger firms --would choose to participate at an early age, e.g. T 1 ;
the smaller firms with shorter expected lifetimes would defer until a later age, e.g. T 2 .
Realistically, as shown in Figure 2 , the benefits of participation are likely to be greater for larger firms. This simply accentuates the positive relationship between size and participation: larger firms realize greater per period benefits from formality and they expect to reap those benefits over a longer period.
Similarly, there is a positive relationship between firm age and participation. Older firms have greater expected lifetimes because the increasingly precise estimate of their costs makes it less and less likely that they will fail as time goes on. Consequently, older firms are also larger on average. However, the positive relationship between age and participation is not an artifact of larger size alone. Conditional on size, older firms have longer expected lifetimes 15 and thus greater potential for realizing the benefits of participation. So both firm size and age are positively correlated with participation: among the youngest firms, only the largest choose to become formal; over time they are joined by smaller firms.
To summarize the predictions of our framework:
1. There is heterogeneity in the degree of formality. The benefits and costs of participation undoubtedly vary across societal institutions, and vary for firms of different size and expected lifetime. While there are potential complementarities between different societal institutions, a large number of firms will choose to participate in only a subset of institutions at any point in time. For example, the legal system and bank financing are complements, but a firm may have to register legally before seeking external financing. Thus informality is not an all-ornothing state and the degree varies by firm. This is not addressed by the other theoretical approaches --including models of regulatory and tax compliance that typically consider only one dimension of participation --but it accords with Tokman's observations (1992).
2a. Small firms are disproportionately informal. They benefit least from participation because of the small scope of their dealings with the public and hired employees (relative to the total volume of transactions undertaken by the firm). This has the corollary that:
2b. "Inefficient" firms are disproportionately informal. This implication is in line with many characterizations of the informal sector (Thomas, 1992; Portes, 1994) . However, in contrast to other formulations, in this case the causality is not necessarily from informality to inefficiency.
High ? --i.e. high cost --firms choose less formality because it benefits them less than more efficient firms that produce at higher volumes for longer lengths of time.
2c. Young firms are disproportionately informal. This is partly because young firms are
15 Their more precise cost estimates mean they are less likely to realize unexpectedly bad profits that would cause them to reach the failure bound. more likely to be small. Conditional on size, the population of young firms contains a disproportionate number that have not received enough signals to figure out whether paying the costs of formality are worthwhile; many eventually will go out of business.
3. Mode of operation (type of work site) and formality are jointly determined. Small firms range in mode of operation from ambulatory hawkers to more settled establishments. One dimension of mode of operation, work site permanence, is not addressed by the other theoretical models. However, a number of ad hoc characterizations --most notably de Soto's (1989) --draw a strong link with informality: informal firms operate out of temporary/makeshift buildings or stalls, or even door-to-door. Firm expansion involving greater capital outlays, K, requires greater permanent work sites and, simultaneously, greater formality to establish property rights or formalize contracts.
16
As a second example, firms of different sizes (at different stages of growth) may have different degrees of interaction with the public. Because implicit contracts over product quality are cheaper and feasible to enforce with friends and family, the entrepreneur may find it most cost effective to primarily serve such customers when faced with small sales volumes. At larger volumes (later in the firm's life cycle), friends and family cannot necessarily buy all the firm's output, so sales to the general public and other firms should increase.
4a. Underlying patterns of firm dynamics should be comparable in both developing and industrialized countries. If the distribution of entrepreneurial ability and the learning process are similar across countries, then so should be the patterns of firm entry and exit. This also implies similar firm age distributions and overall firm dynamics (assuming comparable economic environments).
4b. Informal sector firms have relatively high mortality rates. The high turnover rate of informal firms that might appear as evidence of the inferiority of informal employment reflects the high mortality among small firms observed everywhere. The high turnover rate of such firms and jobs is not necessarily related to being informal per se. Although many informal firms will be small 16 Our assumption that the government can perfectly exclude firms that do not voluntarily pay the full costs of participation undoubtedly is too restrictive. Hence larger businesses that have more permanent work sites are easier for the government to detect. So participation --as measured by tax compliance and public registry --will be greater for such firms. mature firms with high costs (but not so high that they eventually go out of business), many will be the "false starters" with imprecise estimates of their profitability that eventually fail.
Firms participate in an increasing number of societal institutions as they grow.
As firms with a low ? grow to their equilibrium size, the depth of participation --measured by the fraction of all institutions in which the firm participates or by the degree of participation with each individual institution --increases as well.
The implications for standard models of tax evasion and regulatory compliance are straightforward. Traditional approaches assume that enforcement agencies try to maximize social benefit (minimize social harm) subject to a binding budget constraint. Both these approaches and ours predict that large firms (the biggest violators on a per unit output basis) are more likely to participate. The difference between approaches lies in the determinants of compliance: traditional approaches assume that enforcement solely determines compliance; we model the (relative) net benefit to the firm. The actual importance of gross benefits versus gross (penalty) costs is an empirical matter, one that, unfortunately, we cannot test with our data. However, our approach shows that both costs and benefits to the firm should be accounted for when attempting to identify the importance of enforcement efforts.
Moreover, our approach indicates that the duration of an economic activity should be considered when modeling participation. Traditional approaches to tax evasion and regulatory compliance typically ignore this issue, in part because they consider long-lived economic agents; in particular, firms are viewed as infinitely long-lived. However, we have shown that if firm dynamics play an important role in the economy --as they appear to do --then they should be factored into participation considerations.
III. Empirical results
1992 National Micro Enterprises Survey (ENAMIN) from Mexico, offers the first comprehensive survey to date on compliance with or participation in several distinct markers of formality including registration with the tax authorities, tax payment, labor protection, participation in guilds or trade associations, and enumeration in the census, as well as other relevant characteristics. It thus, permits us to generate a reliable picture of the nature of informality, as well as to test the consistency of our framework with reality. The sample was generated by selecting approximately 11,000 individuals from the 1991:4 National Urban Employment Survey who declared that they were self-employed or heads of firms of five workers or fewer (fifteen or fewer in manufacturing). They were reinterviewed in the next quarter to generate a more detailed accounting of income, capital stock, costs, employment patterns, and a variety of details related to participation in societal institutions. Of the sample of individuals reinterviewed in early 1992, a total of 9,036 were still operating businesses.
Our empirical approach is to seek patterns of participation that accord with the predictions detailed in the previous section. However it should be emphasized (again) that there is a fundamental identification problem faced both by our methodological approach and by other approaches that assume enforcement efforts are the sole determinants of participation. We are aware of no data set with the requisite information on both costs and benefits of participation to evaluate the relative importance of each approach.
17 Our limited goal in this section is to document empirically the heterogeneity and depth of participation; show the importance of firm size, age, and mode of production as correlates of participation; and (partially) establish a role for firm dynamics and life cycle considerations as key concerns for modeling participation (in both developing and industrialized countries).
Heterogeneity of Participation
Though the data set is bounded above at five workers (fifteen in manufacturing), even within this narrow firm size range informality is clearly not an all or nothing proposition. The summary statistics in Table 1 show that there are high participation rates in societal institutions for even these small firms: 41.7 percent are registered with the federal treasury, 25.2 percent are registered with the local treasury (including Mexico City), 34.6 percent pay some taxes to one or 17 Such a data set would have to identify exogenous variation in government policy that is independent of firms' decisions over formality. This identification is extremely difficult in practice because most policies are implemented nationwide, confounding the effect of policy changes with business cycle and macroeconomic forces that also influence firm behavior. A differences-in-differences approach that utilized between state (or province or region) variation in policies would work in principle. But the existence of multi-establishment firms that cross state lines would make assignment into the proper treatment groups problematic. both treasuries, 34.6 percent of firms with paid workers have them registered with IMSS (Mexico's social security administration), 22.5 percent are members of a business guild or association, 15.6 percent pay dues to a business organization, and 33.1 percent of firms that existed in 1989 were enumerated in the Census of that year. Table 2 presents cross tabulations along several dimensions of participation and shows that participation along one dimension need not imply participation along others. For example, the bottom left panel contains all the firms that have paid workers and are greater than three years old, which means that they should be registered with the federal treasury, should have their (paid) workers registered with IMSS, and should have been enumerated in the Census. However, of this group only 72.9 percent are registered with the federal treasury, 63.8 percent pay taxes, 31.8 percent participated in the Census but not IMSS, while 7.2 percent participate in IMSS but not the Census.
Clearly, participation is a question of degree and spans many dimensions. This suggests that previous research that lumped together all small firms as representing the informal sector (e.g. Rauch, 1991) obscured important differences among them. In the interest of avoiding some of the conceptual confusion that surrounds the topic, it may therefore be preferable that future analysis employ the term "informal" to exclusively refer to the issues of participation discussed here. This would leave considerations of firm size, wages/productivity, labor market segmentation, etc. to be addressed under labels that correspond more precisely to the phenomena being studied. 18 More generally, our evidence indicates that models of regulatory and tax compliance may need to consider possible complementarities between different institutions when modeling participation and enforcement for individual institutions.
Distribution of Formality Across Firm Characteristics
18 This is consistent with many characterizations of the informal sector (Thomas, 1992; Portes, 1994) . Strictly speaking, in our framework firms choose between different institutional arrangements (Lin and Nugent, 1995) . Informality encompasses a set of institutional arrangements including enforcement of contracts through social networks and self-insurance against employee health problems. Formality encompasses a different, complementary set of institutional arrangements including compliance with government reporting requirements. See also Peattie (1987) who critiques usage of the term "informal sector." Points 2a-2c above argue that participation decreases with ? and increases with the probability of long run success. Although we cannot observe either, the framework shows that they are monotonically related, respectively, to firm revenue/size and to firm age (conditional on size). This leads to the following empirical specification:
where revenue is total firm revenue, age is the number of years the firm has been in business (or the number of years the current proprietor has been operating it), and e is an idiosyncratic error term. We measure the probability of participation a number of different ways: (a) as an indicator variable for any participation in an individual institution, (b) as the degree of participation within a particular institution, and (c) as the degree of participation among a range of potential institutions.
In each case the null hypothesis is that: (a) ß 1 >0, (b) ß 2 >0, that is participation should be an increasing function of both firm size and firm age. Table 3 shows the rate of registration with the federal treasury, the rate of registration of firms' paid workers with the social security administration (IMSS), and the rate of enumeration in the 1989 Census by firm size and by firm age. As predicted, there is a very strong positive relationship between participation and firm size/revenue. The relationship between participation and firm age is also positive, though much weaker. Table 4 reports the results from fitting probit regressions for the seven different types of institutions. In each case the coefficients on both firm size and age are positive and significant at better than the 1 percent level of confidence. (The standard errors were corrected for arbitrary forms of heteroskedasticity.) The estimated changes in the probability of participation for a unit change in each regressor are reported in Table 4 .A.
The relationship between size and participation is very strong: each point increase in log revenue corresponds to, for example, a 20 percent greater rate of tax compliance, a 23 percent greater rate of social security compliance, and an 11 percent greater rate of business guild registration. 19 The relationship between age and participation is more marginally significant: a ten year difference in age increases participation in the various institutions by 2 to 4 percent.
20
20 As a specification check, we tried substituting the two sets of dummy variables for the revenue and age classes (from Table 2 ) for the linear terms. The results were qualitatively the same both in these and the subsequent regressions.
One potential concern is that the benefits of participation undoubtedly vary by industry. Given systematic differences in average firm size and age across industry, the positive relationships between size and participation and between age and participation in Table 4 may be spurious. To test this we tried alternate specifications (not reported), both including industry dummies and running separate regressions by industry. The results including industry dummies were virtually identical to those in Table 4 . The industry-specific regressions, despite the markedly reduced degrees of freedom, also yielded comparable results.
Mode of operation.
Table 5 reports the results from fitting equation (4) to two other measures of formality that capture the nature of the production process jointly determined with the level of formality: the permanence of the firm's work site and whether individuals and families are the firm's only main customers. Permanent work site is a dummy variable equal to one for those firms that operate out of a fixed site in a public marketplace, a factory, a variety/grocery store, or a retail service establishment. 21 Changes in probabilities are reported in Table 5 .A. As expected, firm size and age are positively (and significantly) related to work site permanence: older firms and those producing at larger volumes require more permanent work sites.
The indicator for firms whose only main customers are individuals and families potentially is an inverse measure of formality. The ideal measure would include only close friends and family of the proprietor. The survey's measure is more broad but may still provide evidence in favor of our framework, so long as the measure is most accurate for smaller firms. Smaller firms should market more exclusively to close acquaintances because larger volumes of production require firms to seek customers among the general public. The measure may be negatively related to firm age for the same reason 21 Only those firms operating out of temporary work sites that might serve as launching pads for more permanent work sites, and those firms operating out of permanent work sites that could have transitioned from a less permanent work site, were included in the regression. Excluded firms included those operating out of unspecified nonpermanent or permanent work sites. In addition, those whose business is the transportation of people or merchandise, and hotels/taverns/inns/hostels were not included in the regression. Specifications that, in turn, (a) included these firms, and (b) limited the definition more narrowly, yielded comparable results.
The second row of Table 5 shows that, as predicted, firm size is negatively related to whether the firm sells primarily to only individuals and families. However, the relationship with firm age is positive. To investigate the source of that positive relationship, the bottom row of the table reports the same regression including industry dummies. The results show that the positive relationship disappears when industry dummies are included, indicating a spurious effect in the previous regression. However, the strong negative relationship with firm size persists, providing evidence in favor of our framework. Separate regressions by industry (not reported) yielded similar results.
Firm dynamics
To fully test the dynamics of our framework would require longitudinal data. Though the ENAMIN is the most comprehensive data source available to date, it lacks this dimension. Nonetheless, the cross sectional evidence it does offer is consistent with our framework. First, though the data is truncated at a firm size of five employees (fifteen in manufacturing), long lived firms exist across the revenue distribution, reflecting the underlying distribution of ?. Remarkably, average firm age is roughly the same across all deciles of the revenue distribution, ranging from a low of 7.9 years for the seventh decile to a high of 9.0 years for the second decile; the first and last deciles have respective means of 8.8 and 8.7 years.
22 Moreover, the relatively uniform revenue-age distribution is not an artifact of the upper limit on number of employees: average firm revenue in the last revenue decile is more than eighty times larger than the first revenue decile.
This suggests that this population of firms may be in a steady state, with entry and exit rates roughly uniform across the revenue distribution.
23 22 The difference in average firm age between the second and seventh deciles is statistically significant at a five percent level of confidence. The difference between the first and last deciles is not. 23 Note that "exit" could happen for two reasons. The upper size limit on number of employees means that firms would leave the sample frame either if they failed or if they added too many employees. Smaller firms undoubtedly are more likely to fail; whereas larger firms are more likely to grow their way out of the sample frame.
Second, the observed patterns of firm entry and exit are consistent with those predicted by our framework and with those observed in the U.S. and in other developing countries. Numerous studies have documented high entry and failure rates among startups that decline with size and age of the firm. 24 Evans and Leighton's (1989) study of self-employment dynamics in the U.S.
provides the most comparable benchmark for our analysis. They find that inflows into selfemployment over the previous year account for about 20 percent of self-employment for men over 35, with an even greater proportion for younger men. This is consistent with a constant rate of entry and older men running more established firms that are less likely to fail. Evans and
Leighton also document a sharply decreasing exit rate from self-employment for the U.S., with the probability of failure ranging from 15 percent for the oldest of the self-employed to over 50 percent for the youngest of the self-employed.
The overall patterns of firm age by age of the owner for Mexico in Table 6 are comparable. The last two sets of columns in Table 6 show the fraction and number of firms at each age range that are no more than one year and two years old, respectively. Consistent with Evans and Leighton's estimates, the number of entries is relatively flat throughout the life cycle.
Yet the fraction of the self employed comprised of new entrants declines steadily, commensurate with a sharp increase in average firm age. Together, these patterns suggest that declining exit rates are probably partially responsible for the sharp increase in average firm age in these data.
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These broad similarities in self-employment dynamics between Mexico and the U.S. suggest that common determinants of self-employment may be as important as differing institutional factors in explaining the observed patterns of participation.
Depth of participation
Our approach predicts that firms participate in an increasing number of institutions as they grow. Again, because the ENAMIN lacks a longitudinal dimension, we cannot directly test the time series implications. However, the cross sectional implications are supported by the data.
The depth of participation --as measured by degree of compliance --is analyzed in Table   7 . Two measures are used: the fraction of the firm's paid workers registered with IMSS (for the subset of firms with any paid workers), and the fraction of all institutions in which the firm participates. Both variables are bounded below by zero and above by one, so the estimation used double-censored tobits. 26 The second and third rows of the table report two different specifications for the fraction of all institutions in which the firm participates. The first encompasses all seven institutions in Table 4 . The second excludes business guild registration and dues payment because not all firms may have access to such institutions; i.e. differences between firms in participation along this dimension may simply represent cross-industry differences in production technology or market structure.
The patterns in Table 7 again are consistent with our prediction that the depth of participation is an increasing function of both firm size and age. Excluding business guild registration and dues payment in the third row makes these relationships stronger. The inclusion of industry dummies (not reported) leaves the results largely unchanged.
IV. Relation to Previous Informal Sector Research
The framework offered here departs from the premise that the small scale firms found in developing countries are fundamentally different from those in industrialized countries. Thus, it is solidly in the spirit of Hart (1972) and de Soto who stressed the intrinsic dynamism of the sector.
In conceiving of formality as an input into the production function and that firms choose the optimal level along a continuum, we provide a theoretical underpinning both for Tokman's grey areas of partial compliance, and for de Soto's view that a lack of access to institutions is a binding 26 Ordinary least squares regressions yielded comparable results.
constraint on firm growth.
De Soto claimed that onerous compliance costs prevent firms from becoming formal. This concern was echoed by Porter (1995) who cited high and uncertain regulatory costs as barriers to firm growth in United States inner cities. Both of these perspectives are easily nested in our framework as a case where the government sets p 0 so high that for most firms the discounted net present value of participation never exceeds its costs. But our model also implies that it may never be possible to induce all firms to participate simply by streamlining compliance procedures: for many very small firms, the benefits of participation may not exceed even modest costs.
27
By relaxing our stylized view of the well functioning "market" for formality, we can encompass both Rauch's and Loayza's views. Clearly, reality is more complex than our extreme assumption that firms get only the participation they pay for and pay for none they do not want.
Many institutions of civic society are public goods and the government imposes universal fiscal levies, making tax evasion attractive. Moreover, an enforcement agency seeking to maximize social benefit could easily choose to focus its efforts on longstanding, large firms, leaving the door open for small, low productivity firms to avoid taxation and regulation. Rauch, in fact, defines the informal sector as those firms of a size below which the government chooses not to enforce minimum wages. Incorporating this into our perspective, a growing firm may willingly choose to comply with such size-based regulations in order to get unimpeded access to necessary institutions.
28
The logic behind Esfahani and Salehi-Isfahani's model (1989) is also consistent with the view presented here. Larger firms use more complex production technologies as they grow, making worker monitoring more difficult. They thus voluntarily pay efficiency wages that, in practice, may include health care or other benefits, to reduce shirking. Again, more efficient firms would become increasingly formal as they grow. But formality of the firm is an independent consideration from the wages it pays its workers: a small, longstanding firm that does not pay efficiency wages likely would participate in formal institutions such as the legal and banking 27 See Ozorio de Almeida, et al. (1994) for a discussion of deregulating the informal sector. 28 In this example, the cost of complying with the minimum wage is part of p 0 and p t .
systems.
29
29 Both Schaffner (1996) and Velenchik (1996) have documented a positive firm-size wage effect for Peru and Zimbabwe. Such an effect is a critical component of Esfahani and Salehi-Isfahani's efficiency wage model. However, both of the former authors argue that such evidence is not supportive of that class of model.
Finally, there is nothing in the static nature of previous models that makes them inconsistent with the approach described here. For instance, both Rauch and Loayza require an exogenous change in government policy to induce transitions between the formal and informal sectors. But this arises purely because they were not concerned with modeling firm dynamics.
Within the context of our approach, such a policy change is equivalent to altering p 0 and/or p t , which leads to comparable comparative static results as those described in both Rauch and Loayza.
Conclusion
Using a unique data set from Mexico, we have provided a more detailed characterization of the nature of informal production than previously possible. Beyond the empirical regularities, we also have offered a new approach to analyzing the informal sector. This approach assumes that informal firms in developing countries behave similarly to those in the industrialized countries, and is based on a model of firm dynamics frequently used in the industrial organization literature. It offers an alternative motivation for informality which, unlike much of the literature on tax evasion and regulatory compliance, asserts that participation in societal institutions may be essential to growth, and therefore at least partially voluntary. It also can nest many existing models that base existence of the informal sector solely on institutional distortions, market failures, or excessive government regulation. Though the data do not permit a definitive test of competing models, they are consistent with the predictions of our approach. This suggests that our framework is an important benchmark to be considered when analyzing the informal sector and regulatory compliance. 
